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the Ethical Basis of Bureaucratic Action:
~ :rnocracy, Rationalization, and Communicative Competence
STEVEN D. E ALY
Armstrong State College

In this paper I analyze and evaluate three models of administrative ac. n· Weber's rationalized bureaucracy, Long's democratic bureaucracy,
tJO ·
nd Habermas' s interactive bureaucracy . All three of these approaches
alaim to pro vide a normative foundation for bureaucratic activity. Of the
~hree, however, only Habermas's model, based on the theory of communicative competence, actually provides an adequate ethica.l framework
for bureau cratic action.

Rationalization and Bureaucratic Action
Based on a reading of Max Weber's analysis of bureaucracy, one might
conclude that "bureaucratic ethics" is a self-contradictory concept. in his
famous distinction between the official and the politician, Weber maintains
that the official , unlike the politician, engages in impartial administration.
The official' s sole responsibility is to be the executor of the will of the
superior authority.
The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiou sly the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order
agreed with his own conviction. This holds even if the order appears
wrong to him and if, despite the civil servant's remonstrances, the
authority insists on the order. Without this moral discipline and selfdenial, in th e highest sense, the whole apparatus would fall to pieces.
This exhau sts the moral obligation of the official: to do as he is told. 1
The official , unlike the politician, has no personal responsibility for what is
done.
For Weber, bureaucracy itself is an attempt to rationalize governmental activity in accordance with the distinction between politics and administration. The politician is concerned with values, with setting the goals
of government. The bureaucrat is concerned with administering the programs set up to achieve the goals selected by the politician. The activity of
the bureaucrat , then, is legitimately judged in terms of economy and efficiency rather than in terms of the rightness or wrongness of actions taken.
This view is not merely of historical interest, however, for there are
those who hold variations of Weber's position today. This is the general
view, for example, for Victor Thompson . According to Thompson, the
modern public organization is "a machine-like instrument or tool. It is an
artificial system of prescribed roles and rules." 2 The organization does not
care, nor does it feel. It acts "without sympathy or enthusiasm" to carry
out efficiently the "externally defined goal" set by its owner.
If this understanding is correct, then the proper response to the question "Who acts in bureaucratic action?" is that no one acts. It is not a who
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that acts , but a what-an organization, an agency, a bureau, or an offic
Thompson, of course, recognizes that there are individuals in organi~:
tions. In fact, individuals may even be a key element in organizati ons f
"human institutions are shaped by the kind of human material availabie ;;
them. " 3
The fact that persons people organizations creates a problem fo
Thompson, for these persons may attempt to act in ways which are not con~
ducive to, or which are even contrary to, the goal of the organizati on asset
by the organization's owner. Control, therefore, becomes the gui ding Prin.
ciple for an organization's structure and operation.
To ensure that the owner's goals are achieved, the indivi duals who
work in the bureaucracy (the "human material") must be "neutr alized," or
at least their personal goals and desires must be neutralized, so that they can
efficiently and rationally carry out their orders. These neutr alized individuals become "functionaries" who do their duty, apply their skills, and
perform their practical routine, regardless of what or whose goal is involved.•
The purpose of this neutralizing of the individuals who work for the
bureaucracy is to ensure that when they act, they act as a part of the
organization . The organization, which Thompson has already indicated
cannot feel or care, cannot type either. A functionary is therefore needed to
do the typ ·ng. The same is true for making phone calls, for revie wing ap.
plications, ·or sorting applications into categories, and for saying yes or no
in the case of each request. All of these activities are carried on by functionaries. These functionaries are the organization in action.
If this view is correct, then "bureaucratic ethics" is a simple matter involving mere obedience to orders. There are, however, at least two difficulties with this view. First, this view presents an unrealistic picture of the
way organizations actually function. Second, this view is an unacceptable
guide to the way in which organizations should function, for it leads to irresponsible action.
It is now widely accepted that the politics/administration
dichotomy
introduced by Weber is not as clear-cut as he may have thought.' Observation of the operations of bureaucracy in the United States tends to support
Norton Long's claim that "the bureaucracy is in policy, and major policy,
to stay . " 6 This is true, not only for career civil servants who have worked
their way to the top of the bureaucratic structure, but for agency employees
at all levels. This is not simply because of a desire on the part of civil ser•
vants to usurp the legitimate authority of political leaders. On a day-to-day
basis, administrative decisions routinely involve considerations which require an interpretation and application of policy. These "ends " issues cannot be separated from the "means" issues left to bureaucrats in the rational
model. '
Paralleling the claim that organizations do not and cannot fu nction on
the basis of a division between politics and administration is the claim that
organizations should not attempt to function on the basis of such a divorce.
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fhe separation of politics from administration will lead to irresponsible ac. n and will foster the fiction that " the system" alone is responsible for
tl~a~ happens . For Weber, "the honor of the political leader ....
lies
weciselYin an exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, a responpi~ilitYhe cannot and must not reject or transfer."' Weber is here con:rasting the politician with the official, who has no personal responsibility
for what he does.
This understanding allows for the evaporation of responsibility in at
least two ways . First, it leads to what Orion White has called "apparent action," action taken by institutions.9 This appearance of "institutional action" is made possible by the specialization and compartmentalization of
modern organizations. The functionary who gives an order is not the individual who carries out the order, and thus there is a separation of will
from action . The functionary who executes the order does so without thinking (or in spite of thinking), and thus there is a separation of action from
reason. This distance separating the functionary from the action he has
ordered makes it appear that the organization is acting, rather than the
functionary. Institutions or organizations cannot act, any more than they
can type. Only the individuals who make up the organization can act. The
functionary, not the organization, acts. Neither functionary, however, is
responsible for the action taken according to this view . Externally, it appears tha t "the system," rather than the "human material," is responsible.
But this, in fact, means that responsibility cannot be placed anywhere .
Second, this view inhibits those within the organization from
understanding that they (rather than "the organization") are acting. The
fiction that the acts of the functionary are in reality the acts of the organization separates the actor from understanding his own action as his action.
This can be seen in the claim that one is not responsible because he was "only
following orders ." Even in simply "following the rules," however the official is acting . The functionary sees his own action as the organization's action. By filling a role in the organization, he is not himself doing anything,
the organi zational role is. In his "role" as a human being, with opinions
concerning jutice and injustice, he maintains his freedom to choose between
right and wrong. But these two roles do not mix . At home in the evening,
the human being may disapprove of what the functionary was called upon
to do at work, but he is certainly not responsible for what the functionary
may have done. 10
In addition to the problem of responsibility, the use of rationalization
as a guide to action provides no standard for conduct in individual cases in
which the bureaucrat is required to deal with an individual. While "universal" standards require that all likes be treated alike, no guidance in terms of
treatment is provided. While the rational mode of calculation may be able
to tell one the most efficient way to route mail or build a bridge, it does not
provide guidance for the way to deal with other people. It is this very inability which Thompson seeks to cover by speaking of "roles" rather than
individuals.
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Democracy and Bureaucratic Action
The "rational" understanding of bureaucratic action has been attacked
by those who see the bureaucracy as inextricably entangled in the making of
"value decisions" (policy making). Since the separation of politics and ad.
ministration is a fiction, it is no longer possible to accept purp osive ra.
tionality as the basis for bureaucratic action. In the "democratic" view of
bureaucratic activity, attention shifts from control of function ari es to con.
cern for "the people," the "owners" of the organization. The democratic
critics of rational administration agree with Thompson that "the people" is
the owner, but they disagree over how the will of the owner is to be determined.
The standard answer to the question of the will of the people (and the
answer given by many "rationalists") is that the will of the people is ern.
bodied in the laws of the land . That is, the legislature represents the will of
the people, and the bureaucracy should simply execute the law. If the law is
unclear, then the bureaucracy should follow the lead of the legislature. ,,
Norton Long argues that this matter is not quite so simple, however. In
a system with a two-house legislature, which house is to be tr eated as
authoritative in identifying the will of the people? To further complicate
matters, the executive is also elected, is ultimately responsible for the activity
of the bureaucracy, and can claim to represent the will of the people. In
such circumstances, who actually does represent the will of the people? ' 2
The answer given by the "democrats" is that the bureaucracy looks to
neither legislature nor executive, but settles for itself what the Jaw means
and how it shall be carried out. This is the case not only at the " policymaking" level of the bureaucracy, but also lower in the organiz ational
structure, because policy as set by administrative order is not necessarily
any more comprehensive or understandable than that enacted in law.
Long's solution to the problem of bureaucratic action is " representative bureaucracy." By respresentative bureaucracy Long mea ns that the
makeup of the bureaucracy reflects the makeup of the nation at large . Long
argues that there are key elements of society which are "unre pre sented,
underrepresented,
or malrepresented
in Congress,"
but which are
represented adequately in the bureaucracy. ' 3 In fact, according to Long,
if one rejects the view that election is the sine qua non of representation, the bureaucracy now has a very real claim to be conside red much
more representative of the American people in its compositi on than the
Congress. This is not merely the case with respect to the class structure
of the country but, equally significantly, with respect to the learned
groups, skills, economic interests, races, nationalities, and religions.
The rich diversity that makes up the United States is better repre sented
in its civil service than anywhere else. 1•
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Assuming for a moment that there is a "class interest" based on sex,
ce religion, age, and education, does a demographically representative
~a r;aucracy ensure that these interests will be represented? Subramaniam
~gues that bureaucrats drawn from these particular types of groups tend to
~eviate from the norms of those groups. 15 But even if there is an identifiable
lass interest, and even if the members of these groups remain faithful to
class norms, how do the democrats want these norms to affect the activity
:f these "representative bureaucrats?'" 6
Long does not answer this question directly, but approaches it obliquely
through what he calls the "ethical constitution of bureaucracy." 17 Long unfortunately treats this issue by stating merely that the bureaucracy is at least
a concerned with constitutional government as in the Congress. Paul Van
Riper, however, formalizes this aspect of the problem in his definition of
representative bureaucracy. According to Van Riper, a representative
bureaucracy is one which has a reasonable cross section of members from
the various groups of society, and which is in general tune with the ethos
and attitudes of society." It is this second requirement which is essential if
representative bureaucracy is to represent the will of the people.
Does this notion of representative bureaucracy provide a standard
from which to judge and on which to base bureaucratic action? Does
representative bureaucracy provide for responsible action? The answer to
both of these questions is no.
The notion of representative bureaucracy changes the "rational" question of "what does the politician want me to do?" to "what do 'the people'
want me to do?" In making this transition, the question becomes almost
impossible to answer. The will of one man, at least, can be determined with
ome confidence. Determining "the will of the people" is very difficult indeed, and for the same reasons which Long himself has enumerated.
Perhaps Long wants to maintain that it is somehow easier for bureaucrats
to identify or embody the will of the people than it is for legislators. The
danger of this approach, especially if these representative bureaucrats are
motivated by their class interest, is that they will tend to identify a select
group as "the people.'" 9 This notion provides no guidance in determining
the proper choices in individual cases.
An even greater difficulty than this, however, is found in the irrespon~ible nature of bureaucratic action under such a scheme. "The people"
replaces "the politician," but the divorce of will from action, and action
from reason, will be at least as great under representative bureaucracy as
under rational bureaucracy. Further, the blindness of the actor will be at
least as great also. Instead of confusing oneself with the "organization,"
the bureaucrat will confuse his action with the action of "the people."
The democratic model of bureaucratic action thus faces the same problems faced by the rational model. 2 ° First, there is no way to translate "the
will of the people" into guidance for individual actions. Second, the responibility of the actor (the bureaucrat) is obscured by the fiction that it is the
people, rather than the individual, who is acting.
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Communicative Competence and Bureaucratic Action
In this section I present the theory of communicative com petence as
alternative understanding of bureaucracy which does provi de an ethi:
foundation for bureaucratic action. When Victor Thompson speaks of th
organization as a system of rules and roles, he reifies what is actually a P t~
tern of interaction between individuals (or groups of individua ls). In soda
ing, he abstracts the most important element from conside rat ion: peopt'
Organizations are people, acting in more or less stable ways over a period
time. The major problem with both the rational and the democratic ap.
proaches to bureaucratic action is the assumption both make that th
organization is established by an external force, which sets the agenda
the organization. As a result of this assumption, and the atte ndant distinc.
tion between owner and organization, the separation of will and reason
from action occurs.
Rather than speaking of rules and roles in the abstract, it is more accurate to say, as does Herbert Storing, that "the civil servant is full of procedures, rules, and regulations. " 21 This places the acting individual at the
core of bureaucratic activity. We can go even farther than th is, however.
The rules, regulations, and procedures which the bureaucrat is full of, arc
not simply imposed on him by a higher authority, but are developed
through the mutual action, interaction, and reaction, of superi ors, subordinates, and extra-organizational third parties who are invo lved with the
organization . The bureaucrat doing his job is not simply dro pped into an
artificial system which is already established, but he himself helps to create
and recreate the system as he engages in activity. The rules, regula tions, and
norms which are codified in writings on bureaucracy are snaps hots which
show as immobile what in reality is in motion.

if

fo;

Speech Acts and Bureaucratic Actions
The use of the theory of communicative competence to analyze and
evaluate bureaucratic action is not simply arbitrary, but grows out of the
nature of bureaucratic activity . When we examine bureaucratic action, what
we are examining in most cases is communicative action: the establishment
and interpretation of rules, the issuance of directives, the rejec tion or approval of various types of requests. What the bureaucrat spends his time doing is communicating, either through speaking or writing .
A distinction borrowed from linguistic analysis will help to clarify the
nature of bureaucratic action. The elementary unit of speech is the speech
act, "the smallest (verbal) utterance which is comprehensible and acceptable to at least one other competent actor within a com munication
context. " 22 This speech act, according to Jurgen Haberman, has a double
structure, which may be seen by dividing the speech act into its two
components. 21
The dominant component of the speech act, the performativ e component , provides the pragmatic context of speech through the establis hment of
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.
ersonal relationships. 2 • These relationships form the basis for interinte~Ptivity and allow for mutual understanding. This development of inubJec
. .
b'ectivity is the f'irst 1eve 1 o f commumcat1on.
ters\te dependent component of the speech act is the proposition, which
'des the content of speech. The proposition establishes the connection
p~o~~ speech act with the world of events and objects. This disclosure of the
0
t Id (objectivity) is the second level of communication. n
wor A successful speec h act requires
.
. .
t h at t h e part1c1pant
spea k er- h earers
municate on both levels simultaneously and that the double structure of
co:ch be fulfilled. This means that, in the speech act, both the objective
P rid (of propositions) and the intersubjective world (of mutual subjective
WO
• d .
nderstanding) are pos1te
s1muItaneous Iy. 26
u The main features of this analysis of the speech act can be applied to
the analysis of bureaucratic action. The elementary unit of bureaucratic activity is "the bureaucratic act," which has a double structure. The objective
component of the bureaucratic act is "the decision," which is comparable
the proposition of the speech act. The decisional component of the
10
bureaucratic act is the output of bureaucratic activity, the "yes" or "no" in
response to a particular request.
The second component of the bureaucratic act is its performative
dimension, which provides the pragmatic context for action. This component of the bureaucratic act establishes the internal context of action
through the relationships between co-workers, between supervisors and
subordinates, and between unit heads and employees. This component also
establishes the external context of action through relationships between the
staffs of different agencies, between political agents and staff, and between
clients or adversaries (the public) and the office staff.
It is this distinction which allows one to speak of the ethical basis of
bureaucratic action without becoming totally entangled in the policy dimenion of bureaucratic activity. The performative component of action can be
evaluated apart from the policy or decision component of that action .
This distinction also allows for the solution of the problem that motiated Thompson's attack on sympathy and enthusiasm. For Thompson,
"sympathy" (any non-rationalized consideration affecting organizational
operations) necessarily leads to "stealing"
from the organization's
owners. 21 It is possible, however, to reconcile "sympathy" (the recognition
of the intersubjective dimensions of organizational activity) with the public
good if the distinction between performance and decision is maintained.
While there is undoubtedly a connection between the propositional and the
performative components of bureaucratic action, the treatment of clients in
"human" rather than "rationalized"
terms does not mean that the
bureaucrat will simply give in to the illegitimate demands of potential
clients.
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The Validity Claims of Speech and Bureau<;raticEthics
With the parallel between the speech act and burea ucratic acti
established, I turn to the ethical foundation of speech and its relationship on
bureaucratic ethics. Every speech act raises simultaneously fo ur validi~o
claims: truth, legitimacy, sincerity, and comprehensibility. In normal coi:.
munication these four claims stand as the tacit background con sensus fo
ongoing communicative action, but any or all of these clai ms may ~
challenged and thus become the object of investigation. 21
The claim to comprehensibility is settled by the very act of corn.
municating. According to Habermas, clarity is a prerequisite for all corn.
munication, and its claim is satisfied so long as communicatio n is actually
taking place . If clarity is lacking, then the utterances of one or both parties
are unintelligible, and communication will stop until a langu age of mutual
understanding is found .
The claim to sincerity can be satisfied only through interac tion over a
period of time. Satisfaction of this claim is based on the coinc idence of the
speaker's actual behavior with the intentions he has impute d to himself.
While the first two validity claims may be settled em pirically, the
claims to truth and to legitimacy can be settled only throug h free and open
discussion, or discourse. In discourse the only force which may influence a
decision or agreement is the force of the better argument. To ensure that no
other force interferes in the free development of consensus, discourse posits
the equality and freedom of all speakers to participate in the ongoing
discussion. 29 While these conditions may not actually be fulfille d in any real
setting, every communication "anticipates" these conditi ons (which are
identified by Habermas as the "ideal speech situation"). 30
The nature of language then provides us with the standar d by which to
judge its use. But beyond a standard for the explicit use of language, the
nature of language also provides us with a standard from whic h to judge all
human action, which ultimately is communicative action. 31
The natural standards of speech therefore provide the ethical foundation for bureaucratic action. Bureaucratic action may be ju dged in terms of
its truth, its clarity, its sincererity, and its legitimacy . To be more specific
and accurate, the action of bureaucrats may be judged in these terms . To
adhere to the distinction made earlier, truth and legitimacy are the validity
claims which underlie the "propositional component" of bur eaucratic activity (the policy, the decision), while clarity and sincerity underlie the
establishment of the intersubjective context of bureaucratic activity (the
"performative component" of bureaucratic action) .
Just as truth and legitimacy are discursively determined, so the propositional component is judged in terms of the "critica l interaction"
underlying its acceptance and implementation. 32 Such critic al interaction
approximates the ideal speech situation by allowing political an d technical
personnel to discuss the policy issues involved in bureaucratic action in a
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.......---

tting in which all concerns-technical,
scientists and component of
se reaucratic action, the performative component, ties the actor directly to
~~ action. In this scheme the bureaucrat is responsible both for the action
·tself and for the contest of the action .
1
The performative component of bureaucratic action is judged by the
tual degree of clarity and openness on the part of the bureaucrat, just as
ataritY and sincerity claims are settled empirically. My argument is that
~hesenotions can provide us with a critical standard from which to judge
day-to-day routines of bureaucratic activity. These standards can also provide us with a critique of our own actions as we operate within a
bureaucratic framework. In dealing with intra-organizational associates,
clarity and sincerity will allow the organization to know what it itself is doing. In dealing with extra-organizational parties, clarity, and openness will
allow for the critical interaction of these parties in organizational activities.
I conclude with two observations. First, the distinction between policy
and day-to-day activity is artificial. The standards of day-to -day activity
will impinge on policy questions, as will policy standards (truth and
legitimacy) impinge on day-to-day activities. The approximation of clarity
and sincerity may well entail certain policy consequences, and thus provides
an exmple of the "anticipation" of the ideal speech situation.
Second, Habermas claims that if clarity is not achieved, communication breaks down. 34 In the case of bureaucratic activity, however, communication continues and even accelerates in the face of incomprehensibility.
While one may not find communication is such situations, one does find
''psuedo-communication. " 35 This may be either accidental or intentional,
for incomprehensibility may be used as a weapon either in internal struggles
or against outside parties. Incomprehensibility, in fact, is an especially effective weapon if it is tied to the tools of political violence, such as the enforcement powers accorded to an agency. When instrumental action, and
thus control, becomes the guiding principle of bureaucratic organization,
we should perhaps expect this to be the case, for confusion facilitates control. 36
It very well may be that the apparently insurmountable lack of clarity
found in bureaucratic pronouncements, regulations, and guidelines, and the
obvious lack of interest or concern on the part of bureaucrats before the
public eye, are at the heart of the intuitive understanding that' 'bureaucratic
ethics" are non-existent. If this is the case, then we can see the primary importance of the performative aspect of bureaucratic action. Regardless of
the policy orientation of the bureaucracy, until it is perceived to be
operating in a clear and truthful (sincere) manner, it will be perceived to be
operating in an ethical vacuum. Until the bureaucrat speaks and acts clearly
and sincerely, he is acting unethically.
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Po Ill for an overview of the many dimensions of Habermas, see Thomas McCarthy, The
19 ./)~ 1 Theory of Jurgen Habermas (London : Hutchinson, 1978). Other valuable works on
Crt;crmas include Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory
Ha e York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1976), T. A. McCarthy, "A Theory of Com( e\aiive interests and his linguistic concerns, see his Theory and Practice, trans . John
m_un;cl (Bo ton: Beacon Press, 1973), pp . 7-40, and "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human
ier ests " Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3 (1973): 157-183.
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In defining the speech act as the elementary umt of speech Habermas 1s followmg John
le In general, Habermas makes use of the work of Searle and John Austin as a taking-off
S~t for developing his own theory of "universal pragmatics" (McCarthy, Critical Theory,
0
P ~ 75. Habermas, "Some Distinctions," p. I 56, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Comp. tenc~ " in Hans Peter Dreitzel, editor, Recent Sociology No . 2: Patterns of Communicative
~~havi~r (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 138ff., 147- 148, and Communication and the
Evolution of Society, trans . Thomas McCarthy [Boston : Beacon Press, 1979), pp . 26, 39-40,
50-53 59-61).
,,',.some Distinctions," pp . 156-157; also see McCarthy, Critical Theory pp . 282ff .
"Habermas, Communication and Evolution, pp . 41-44 .
"Habermas, "Postscript," pp. 166ff.
'•Habermas, "Postscript," p. 163.
"Thompson, pp. 10-11.
"Habermas, "Some Distinctions," pp . 158-161, Theory and Practice, pp . 17-20, and
"Postscript," p. 175. Also_see McCarthy, Critical Theory, pp. 288ff.
"Habermas, " Postscnpt," p. 168; McCarthy, "Theory of Competence," p. 139, and
Critical Theory, pp . 291- 333; Ealy, pp. 136- 145.
" In "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," Habermas writes that "no mat ter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding may be deformed, the design of an ideal
speech situation is necessarily im1;>li
.ed ~ith the structure of potential speech" (p. 14:4). The internal drive of speech toward vahdJty 1sso strong that "every speech, even that of mtenuonal
deception, is oriented towards that idea of truth" (p. 144). Compare Knowledge and Human
Interests, trans . Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston : Beacon Press, 1971), p. 314: "Our first sentence
expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained concensus." On "anticipation," see Ealy, pp . 145- 147, 214-215 . On the ideal speech situation, see Habermas,
"Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," pp. 140- 144, McCarthy, Critical
Theory, pp . 306-310, Bernstein, pp. 208- 213, and Ealy, pp. 142-145.
"The crucial place that speech and its natural standards holds for Habermas can be seen in
his understanding of society: "society is a system of action by human beings, who communicate through speech and thus must realize social intercourse within the context of conscious communication" (Theory and Practice, p . 255).
"Habermas discusses three models of the relations between politics and technical experts.
The first, "the decisionistic model," posits a separation of politics and administration with the
superiority of the politician . The "technocratic model" is also based on the distinction between
administration and politics, but the dependence of the administrator on the politician has
reversed itself. Both of these models build upon Weber's notion of purposive-rational action .
The third model, "the pragmatistic model," is based on the notion of institutional rationalization, and posits the critical interaction of politician and expert. See Habermas, Theory and
Practice,pp . 265- 268, Toward a Rational Society, trans. Jeremey J. Shapiro (Boston : Beacon
Press, 1970), pp . 91- 92, 63-64.
.
"Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, p. 68. Habermas deals with this public mediation
m terms of an expanded notion of democracy. He defines democratic decision making as "rationalizing decisions in such a way that they can be made dependent on a consensus arrived at
through discussion free from domination" (Toward a Rational Society, p. 10; cf. p.57) .
''Habermas, "Some Distinctions," p. 159, Theory and Practice, p . 18.
"Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," p. 117.
"C~. Hummel, pp . 143-148, and Murray Edelman, Political Language (New York:
Academic Press, 1977), pp. 96-101. This consideration ties these reflections on communicative
compct~nce to Habermas's discussion of the types of human interest underlying knowledge
and acuon. "Technical interest" leads to control, "practical interest" to intersubjective
understanding, and the "emancipatory interest" leads toward self-reflection and thus the
release from "false consciousness" (see Knowledge and Human Interests, pp . 308-311) .
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